(Consulting Psychologist, Royal Hospital for Sick Children, Glasgow.) Theories of aphasia are psychological in that they concern disturbances of speech, which are primarily psychical phenomena; they are neurological in so far as the explanation of these disturbances is neurological. They must, therefore, inevitably reflect their authors' knowledge of the psychology and neurology of their patients: generally they reflect also the knowledge and methodology of the period in which they are propounded.
It is one of the merits and misfortunes of Hughlings Jackson's work that it was in advance of his time: he saw clearly that aphasia was primarily a psychological phenomenon, that the speech and behaviour of the patient had to be studied and accurately recorded before any attempt was made to correlate it with anatomical changes, that it was advisable to consider what psychologists and philologists knew regarding thought and speech, and that speech, being only one form of mental activity, should be studied in relationship to other forms. In his insistence on the need for making a careful and full record of the behaviour of his patients he pointed the way to modern psychological practice. Not very long ago philosophers used to write psychological treatises based solely on what they learned by casual observation of their own experiences and the behaviour of others: these treatises were a curious mixture of crude introspection and hazy and often dogmatic speculation. The introduction of scientific method and especially of the experimental method has shown the value of careful, systematic study under conditions which have been arranged beforehand.
While he appreciated the psychological problems of aphasia, Hughlings Jackson was also aware of the danger of taking over the concepts of popular psychology, and he was acutely conscious of the treachery of words. " We must," he said, "bear in mind that 'will,' ' (2) It is also assumed that in some marvellous way these mental images are sorted out and pigeon-holed in the brain, so that auditory images of words are stored in one part of it, auditory images of melodies in another, and, if you speak two languages, the auditory images of the two languages are put into different pigeonholes; similarly there is a centre for written language, another for spoken language, another for heard language, and so on, where words and phrases are neatly and tidily sorted out and docketted. Now, apart altogether from the difficulty of conceiving any kind of anatomical mechanism with these properties that A group of artists claimed that they could and usually did paint from their visual images; so they were asked to picture in imagination and then to draw a spade, a fox terrier, and a human head or figure. They knew each of these objects and, though they had previously drawn only the last, they said that they could visualize all of them. They made excellent drawings of the head or figure, their spades were quite good, but their fox terriers were unrecognizable; they were little better than a child might draw. Now, there could be no doubt regarding their ability to draw what they could see; hence it seems legitimate to infer that they drew from their knowledge of things and that their mental images were just concrete expressions of this knowledge: they had the artist's knowledge of the human figure but not of the form of the terrier. Inability to form an image seems to have little or no effect on one's ability to (4) in his study of judgment, discovered attitudes of consciousness (Bewusstseinlagen3 which were different from either sensations or images. Binet'') confirmed this finding. Watt'6' in his association experiments found that these attitudes were determined by the task which was put to his subjects. Messer'7' in his experiments found no case in which the understanding of a word was dependent on an image, and that, when an image did appear, the meaning often came first. Biihler'8' after his exhaustive work on the thought processes came to the conclusion that there was a clear distinction between thought and imagery, that the ultimate elements of the thought-processes were thoughts, not images. Moore'(9 in his work on abstraction found that mental images were not essential either in perception or for recognition, that the essential elements were not images. This is not the place to attempt to discuss the development of the conceptual element in experience; it is, however, sufficiently clear that the simple psychological theory of the "diagram-makers," as Head calls them, will not explain the facts of aphasia, for if it does not represent accurately the facts of normal experience, it cannot account for disturbances of thought and language. The outcome of this work on the thought-processes suggests that inaccurate and inadequate clinical examination of the behaviour and experience of the patients may account for the tiresome literature and bitter controversies that have grown up round this subject of aphasia, which seems to have an irritating effect on the feelings of those who study it and write about it, perhaps because each of the disputants gets only a little bit of the truth and succeeds in distorting it. The facts of aphasia are not so simple as they have seemed.
It is difficult to decide whether a patient has mental images at all, for he is the only person who can have direct cognizance of them: we have to rely on his own account, checking his statements by features of his behaviour which are known to be the usual accompaniments of imaging, such as the tendency of the visualizer to confuse in recollection things that look alike. Head just the sum of its parts, and that in studying mental phenomena it is necessary to take them entire in their own setting.
In its bearing on aphasia this tendency has been most clearly expressed by Head who points out that mental activity is the culmination of a hierarchy of integrations effected by the central nervous system, and that the purposiveness and unitary character of mental activity appears at the lower levels of integration. "Every aspect of mental activity," he says, "is based on a multitude of conscious and unconscious processes, which, as a result of a series of integrations, culminate in a unitary response adapted to the total situation."''"0
The functioning of even the simplest of the nervous arcs must be considered in relationship to its place in the system to which it belongs and to the condition of that system, for its activities vary with the condition of the rest of the organism. Similarly, in the study of 
